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Abstract 
The present study aimed to (1) demonstrate the effect of positive-negative framing on 
experienced criminal justice decision makers, (2) examine the debiasing effect of visually 
structured risk messages, and (3) investigate whether risk perceptions mediate the debiasing 
effect of visual aids on decision making. In two phases, 60 senior police officers estimated 
the accuracy of a counter-terrorism technique in identifying whether a known terror suspect 
poses an imminent danger, and decided whether they would recommend the technique to 
policy makers. Officers also rated their confidence in this recommendation. When 
information about the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism technique was presented in a 
numerical format, officers’ perceptions of accuracy and recommendation decisions were 
susceptible to the framing effect: The technique was perceived to be more accurate and was 
more likely to be recommended when its effectiveness was presented in a positive than 
negative frame. However, when the information was represented visually using icon arrays, 
there were no such framing effects. Finally, perceptions of accuracy mediated the debiasing 
effect of visual aids on recommendation decisions. We offer potential explanations for the 
debiasing effect of visual aids, and implications for communicating risk to experienced, 
professional decision makers. 
 
Keywords: Framing Effect; Visual Aids; Police; Risk Perception; Decision Making; Terrorism 
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On Avoiding Framing Effects in Experienced Decision Makers 
 
The structure and content of risk messages have received considerable attention in the 
judgment and decision making literature. In the present paper, we consider how experienced 
professional decision makers can be biased by the framing of the content of risk messages, 
and we demonstrate the debiasing effects of restructuring such messages in a visual rather 
than numerical format. 
How messages are framed can have a substantial impact on people’s perceptions and 
behaviors (see Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Rothman & Salovey, 
1997). Following the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1982, 1984; see also McNeil, 
Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), framing is defined as the 
presentation of two logically equivalent situations, where one is presented in positive or gain 
terms (e.g., saving lives or making money) and the other in negative or loss terms (e.g., 
deaths or losing money).  
In their classic framing study called the “Asian disease problem,” Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) found that many people preferred a sure option of saving the lives of 200 
(of 600) people threatened by the outbreak of a disease versus a risky option of taking a one-
third chance of saving all 600 people when the options were described in positive terms (i.e., 
number of lives saved). However, when the options were described in negative terms (i.e., 
number of lives lost), many people selected the risky option of a one-third chance that 
nobody will die versus surely losing 400 people. Thus, despite the fact that the options were 
objectively equivalent (but see Mandel, 2001), people demonstrated risk aversion in the 
positive frame and risk seeking in the negative frame. 
Framing effects appear to be ubiquitous. Previous research has shown that individuals 
who have low educational attainment or low cognitive ability demonstrate a stronger 
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susceptibility to message framing than do highly educated individuals (Armstrong, Schwartz, 
Fitzgerald, Putt, & Ubel, 2002) or those who have higher cognitive ability (Stanovich & 
West, 1998). Similarly, individuals with low numeracywho have difficulties grasping 
numerical concepts necessary for understanding risk communication (Cokely, Galesic, 
Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Fagerlin, Ubel, Smith, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2007; 
Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2010)are more susceptible to framing effects than those with 
high numeracy (Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006). 
Framing effects have also been observed in experienced professional decision makers 
in domains such as business (Loke & Tan, 1992; Puto, Patton, & King, 1985; Roszkowski & 
Snelbecker, 1990), career choice (Hesketh, 2000), negotiation (Neale & Bazerman, 1985; 
Neale & Northcraft, 1986; Schurr, 1987), and health (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012). 
However, there is a dearth of published research on the effect of framed messages in the 
criminal justice domain. Senior police officers make all sorts of decisions based on numerical 
information. For instance, they must decide on the best allocation of resources for the 
detection and investigation of crime based on data such as the volume of crime and its impact 
(e.g., number of victims, amount of money stolen, and quantity of drugs involved). Indeed, it 
is perhaps not difficult to imagine a situation where senior officers in the Metropolitan Police 
had to decide on whether or not to send officers to specific areas of London during the 
August 2011 riots based on the proportion of rioters that were (positive frame) or were not 
(negative frame) engaged in robbery, criminal damage, arson, and violence. The first aim of 
the present study is to investigate the effect of positive and negative framing in highly 
educated, experienced senior police officers.  
In recognition of the potential problems associated with the biasing effects of framing, 
researchers have sought to develop debiasing techniques, primarily in research with 
undergraduate students. Three prominent techniques are stating the rationale for a choice 
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(e.g., Kim, Goldstein, Hasher, & Zacks, 2005; Miller & Fagley, 1991; Sieck & Yates, 1997), 
and describing the decision situation to another person before making the choice (Simon, 
Fagley, & Halleran, 2004), which both promote more detailed thinking about the decision 
options. In addition, asking decision makers to list the advantages and disadvantages of the 
decision options, as well as providing a rationale for the option they plan to choose, has been 
shown to eliminate the framing effect (e.g., Almashat, Ayotte, Edelstein, & Margrett, 2008). 
Finally, a study by Jou, Shanteau, and Harris (1996) showed that the effect of positive- and 
negative-framed messages can be eliminated when the two messages are related by a causal 
schema that illustrates that they are equivalent. The second aim of the present study is to 
examine another potential method that can reduce or eliminate the framing effect. 
Specifically, we investigate the debiasing effect of presenting information in a visual format. 
Using Visual Aids to Reduce Framing Effects 
Researchers in the health and medical domains have studied the effectiveness of 
structuring risk messages in a visual rather than numerical format. Visual aids, such as icon 
arrays and bar graphs, have been proposed as potentially promising methods for improving 
the communication and understanding of risks (see e.g., Ancker, Senathirajah, Kukafka, & 
Starren, 2006; Edwards, Elwyn, & Mulley, 2002; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, in press; 
Lipkus, 2007; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997; Paling, 2003). Visual aids appear 
to facilitate information search, encoding and representation, including the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of risky behaviors (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011). 
Indeed, studies have shown that visual aids improve risk understanding (e.g., Galesic, 
Garcia-Retamero, & Gigerenzer, 2009; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010b; Lipkus, 2007; 
Lipkus & Hollands, 1999; Paling, 2003), reduce errors induced by anecdotal narratives 
(Fagerlin, Wang, & Ubel, 2005) and biases such as denominator neglect (e.g., Garcia-
Retamero & Dhami, 2011; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2009; Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & 
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Gigerenzer, 2010; Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, & Maldonado, 2012), as well as increase 
risk avoidance (Schirillo & Stone, 2005). Finally, risk information presented via visual aids is 
perceived to be easier to understand (Goodyear-Smith et al., 2008) and recall (Gaissmaier et 
al., 2011). 
However, previous research on the usefulness of visual aids has often focused on 
people with low numeracy or cognitive capacitywho are more likely to be susceptible to 
biases in judgment and decision making (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). To 
illustrate, in a survey of probabilistic, national samples in two different countries (United 
States and Germany), Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2010b) compared the effectiveness of 
adding different types of visual aids to numerical information about treatment risk reduction. 
Results showed large improvements in accuracy of risk understanding, regardless of which 
type of visual aids was used. In addition, visual aids were most useful for the participants 
who had low numeracy (see Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2009; Garcia-Retamero et al., 2010 
for similar results). It is unclear, however, whether visual aids would be as effective with the 
type of educated and experienced professional decision makers that we study here (i.e., senior 
police officers with a graduate level education).  
In addition, to date, only few studies on visual aids have attempted to reduce the effect 
of framing on risk perceptions and decision making. For instance, Garcia-Retamero and 
Cokely (2011) showed that positive-framed messages were more effective in promoting 
disease prevention (e.g., condom use), whereas negative-framed messages were more 
effective for disease detection (e.g., screening for sexually transmitted diseases). Importantly, 
visual aids made both the positive- and negative-framed messages equally and highly 
effective in promoting prevention and detection (see also Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010a 
for similar results in compliance with surgical procedures and medical treatments). None of 
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this research, however, has examined the debiasing effect of visual aids in experienced 
professional decisions makers as we do.  
Lastly, although a large body of research has investigated the effectiveness of visual 
aids, relatively less research has examined the factors that can mediate their influence on 
decision making (Ancker et al., 2006). The study of Garcia-Retamero and Cokely (2011) 
showed that participants’ beliefs and perceptions about engaging in detection and prevention 
behaviors were more positive when visual aids were added to the framed messages than when 
only numerical information was provided. These positive beliefs and perceptions strongly 
influenced participants’ behavioral intentions, which in turn affected their actual behaviors. 
Hence cognitions can mediate the debiasing effect of visual aids on people’s behavior. To the 
best of our knowledge, however, whether risk perceptions mediate the influence of visual aids 
on decision making has yet to be examined in professional decision makers. Investigating this 
issue is the final aim of the current research.  
The Present Study 
The present study had three main aims. The first was to demonstrate the effect of 
framing on experienced judgment and decision making in the criminal justice domain. In 
particular, we investigated the effect of positive-negative framed messages on senior police 
officers’ perceptions of the accuracy of a counter-terrorism technique, their decisions about 
whether they would recommend the technique to policy makers, as well as their confidence in 
their decisions. The second aim was to examine the debiasing effect of visuallyas opposed 
to numericallystructured risk messages. Finally, we aimed to investigate the processes that 
underlie the debiasing effect of visual aids on decision making. In particular, we explored 
whether police officers’ perceptions of the accuracy of the technique mediated the effect of 
the visual aids on their recommendation decisions. 
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In line with the past literature reviewed above, we hypothesized that experienced 
senior police officers would be susceptible to framing effects when making judgments and 
decisions about the counter-terrorism technique. We further hypothesized that visual aids 
would be effective in reducing this framing effect. Finally, we hypothesized that experienced 
senior police officers’ perceptions of accuracy of the technique would mediate this effect. 
Method 
Participants  
Sixty senior level police officers volunteered to participate in the study. They were all 
recruited from a professional graduate program at the University of Cambridge. The majority 
of the sample (78.3%) was male. The sample had a mean age of 42.0 (SD = 9.4), and the 
majority of the sample (76.7%) had a university education before attending the course at 
Cambridge. The average years of experience in the police force was 15.9 (SD = 10.2).  
Design and Materials 
We employed a mixed design. Message frame (positive vs. negative) was manipulated 
within-subjects, and message format (numerical vs. visual) was manipulated between-
subjects. 
The messages concerned a hypothetical counter-terrorism technique. We ensured that 
the positive- and negative-framed messages were objectively identical and that the same 
information was provided when the information was presented numerically and visually. 
When the information was provided numerically and in positive terms, participants were told: 
“When using this technique, 91 in 100 known terror suspects who organized and committed 
an attack were correctly identified as posing an imminent danger.” When the information was 
provided numerically and in negative terms, participants were told: “When using this 
technique, 9 in 100 known terror suspects who organized and committed an attack were not 
correctly identified as posing an imminent danger.” Figures 1a and 1b describe the 
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information when it was represented visually and in positive and negative terms, respectively. 
We used circles to represent the number of terror suspects because previous research 
(Gaissmaier et al., 2012; Stone, Yates, & Parker, 1997) did not find differences in effects of 
arrays with faces compared to more abstract symbols. For half of the participants, black 
circles represented the terror suspects who were not correctly identified by the technique, and 
white circles were used to represent this number for the other half. In addition, half of the 
participants received visual aids with circles of the same color when the message was 
presented in positive and negative terms. For these participants, circles in the legend were of 
different color in the positive- and negative-framed messages (as in Figures 1a and 1b). The 
rest of the participants received visual aids with circles of swapped colors in the positive- and 
negative-framed messages (e.g., circles representing the terror suspects who were not 
correctly identified in white in the positive-framed message and in black in the negative-
framed message). For these participants, circles in the legend were of the same color in the 
positive- and negative-framed messages. 
<Insert Figures 1a and 1b> 
The data was collected in two phases, conducted one week apart (see Levin, Gaeth, 
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002 for a justification of the time interval between the two phases). 
Participants who received the information about the usefulness of the counter-terrorism 
technique in positive terms in the first phase of the study were provided with the information 
in negative terms in the second phase and vice versa. Participants who received the 
information numerically (or visually) in the first phase also received the information 
numerically (or visually) in the second phase. 
Measures 
In both phases, we measured participants’ perceptions of the accuracy of the counter-
terrorism technique in identifying whether a known terror suspect poses an imminent danger, 
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on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (completely inaccurate) to 5 (completely accurate). 
Participants also decided whether they would recommend the technique to the Home Office 
by providing a binary yes/no response. Finally, participants rated their confidence in their 
recommendation on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely 
confident).  
In order to determine if our manipulation was successful, participants evaluated the 
tone of the message on 7-point scales ranging from −3 (mostly negative) to 3 (mostly 
positive). They also evaluated how informative the message was on 7-point scales ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Procedure  
All participants completed a two phase paper-and-pencil task. In the first phase, 
participants read some information describing a new (fictitious) counter-terrorism technique 
that predicts the likelihood of a known terror suspect committing a terrorist attack, and 
received empirical evidence on the usefulness of the technique when it was used in Canada. 
In the second phase, participants received data on the usefulness of the technique when it was 
used in the U.S. and answered all of the questions again (see Appendix). This represents a 
contemporary example of the policy-related decision making that police officers are involved 
in. The scenario was selected on the basis of its realism given that intelligence and police 
agencies in various countries have been developing profiling techniques for terrorists. An 
informal canvassing of officers and trainers in the Metropolitan police supported the 
representativeness of the scenario. 
The task was self-administered in groups of 20. Participants also provided their 
demographic details (i.e., age, gender, education, and years of experience working as a police 
officer). There were no time constraints, but the task took approximately 10 minutes to 
complete in each phase. The order in which participants received the message frame (i.e., 
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positive-framed message in the first phase and negative-framed message in the second phase 
or vice versa) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results 
To test whether our manipulation was successful, we conducted analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) with message frame (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects factor and 
message format (numerical vs. visual) as a between-subjects factor on participants’ 
evaluations of the tone and informativeness of the message. As required, there was a 
significant main effect of message frame on evaluation of the tone of the message, F1,58=9.85, 
p=.003, η2=.14. Participants who read the positive-framed message evaluated the tone of the 
message as significantly more positive (M=1.7, SEM=.3) than those who read the negative-
framed message (M=.5, SEM=.3). The main effect of message format and the interaction 
between message frame and message format were not significant (F<1). Also as required, 
there was no significant main effect of message frame or message format on evaluations of 
message informativeness. Neither was there any significant interaction effect between these 
factors (F<1). Participants evaluated the message as equally informative when it was 
presented numerically (M=5.3, SEM=.1) and visually (M=5.2, SEM=.1). Below, we present 
the results by dependent measure (i.e., perceptions of accuracy, recommendation decisions, 
and confidence in decisions). Finally, we present the results of a mediational analysis. 
Perceptions of the Accuracy of the Counter-Terrorism Technique 
We examined the effect of message framing on perceptions of the accuracy of the 
counter-terrorism technique and the debiasing effect of the visualas opposed to the 
numericalmessage. First, we compared participants’ perceptions of accuracy when the 
information about the effectiveness of the technique was provided in positive and negative 
terms in the visual and numerical message format conditions. Second, we compared the 
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percentage of participants with consistent perceptions (i.e., with equal perceptions of 
accuracy under the positive and negative message frames). 
The ANOVA with message frame (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects factor 
and message format (numerical vs. visual) as a between-subjects factor on perceptions of 
accuracy showed a significant main effect of message frame, F1,58=21.64, p=.0001, η2=.23.1 
This effect was qualified by an interaction between message frame and message format, 
F1,58=15.03, p=.0003, η2=.16. The main effect of message format was not reliable (F<1). 
When information about the effectiveness of the technique was provided numerically, 
participants perceived the technique as more accurate under the positive than the negative 
frame (p=.0002; see Figure 2). In contrast, when the information about the technique’s 
effectiveness was represented visually, participants perceived the technique as equally 
accurate under the positive and the negative frame (p=.424). Thus, the framing effect was 
more prominent in the numerical than the visual message format condition. Consistent with 
these results, in the visual message format condition more participants (M=90%, SEM=5.6) 
perceived the technique as equally accurate when the information about accuracy was framed 
in positive and negative terms as compared to the numerical message format condition 
(M=37%, SEM=8.9, χ2(1)=18.37, p=.0001, d=1.78). 
<Insert Figure 2> 
Recommendation Decisions 
We examined the effect of message framing and visual aids on participants’ decisions 
to recommend the counter-terrorism technique. First, we compared the percentage of 
participants who recommended the technique when information about its effectiveness was 
provided in positive and negative terms in the visual and numerical message format 
conditions. Second, we compared the percentage of participants who were consistent in their 
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decisions (i.e., who made similar recommendations when the information was framed in 
positive and negative terms).  
As Figure 3 shows, more participants recommended the technique when information 
about effectiveness was provided numerically and framed positively than negatively 
(χ2(1)=15.43, p=.0001, d=.89). In contrast, when information about the technique’s 
effectiveness was represented visually, the percentage of participants who recommended the 
technique was similar under the positive and negative frames (χ2(1)=.07, p=.79, d=.11). In 
line with these results, more participants were consistent in their decisions when the 
technique’s effectiveness was presented visually (M=90%, SEM=5.6) than numerically 
(M=43%, SEM=9.2, χ2(1)=14.70, p=.0001, d=1.56). 
<Insert Figure 3> 
Confidence in Recommendation Decisions 
We examined the effect of message framing and visual aids on participants’ 
confidence in their decisions to recommend the counter-terrorism technique. First, we 
compared confidence when the information about the technique’s effectiveness was provided 
in positive and negative terms in the visual and numerical message format conditions. 
Second, we compared the percentage of participants who were equally confident in their 
decisions when the technique’s effectiveness was expressed in positive and negative terms in 
such conditions. 
The ANOVA with message frame (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects factor 
and message format (numerical vs. visual) as a between-subjects factor on confidence in 
decisions showed a significant main effect of message format, F1,58 =10.51, p=.002, η2=.15. 
There was no significant effect of message frame, and no significant interaction effect (F<1). 
Participants were more confident in their decisions about recommending the technique when 
the information was presented visually (M=5.7, SEM=.1) than numerically (M=4.7, SEM=.2). 
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In addition, more participants were equally confident when the technique’s effectiveness was 
expressed in positive and negative terms in the visual (M=80%, SEM=7.4) than in the 
numerical condition (M=53%, SEM=9.3, χ2(1)=4.80, p=.029; d=.67). 
Mediational Analyses 
Finally, we investigated whether consistency in perceptions of the accuracy of the 
technique mediates the effect of message format on consistency in recommendation 
decisions. For there to be mediation, message format should influence consistency in 
decisions, and the potential mediator (i.e., consistency in perceptions of accuracy) must be 
both affected by message format and related to consistency in decisions (see Baron & Kenny, 
1986). 
In line with the results reported above, regression analyses showed that message 
format influenced both consistency in perceptions of accuracy (ß=.55, t58=5.06, p=.001) and 
consistency in decisions (ß=.49, t58=4.34, p=.001). More participants provided equal 
estimates of the accuracy of the technique and made consistent decisions after receiving the 
visual positive- and negative-framed messages as compared to receiving the same framed 
messages numerically. In addition, consistency in perceptions of accuracy influenced 
consistency in decisions (ß =.78, t58=9.57, p=.001; see Figure 4). Participants with equal 
estimates of the accuracy of the technique under the positive and negative frames often made 
consistent recommendation decisions. Finally, when consistency in perceptions of accuracy 
was included in the regression analysis, the effect of message frame on consistency of 
recommendation decisions was reduced and no longer significant (ß =.09, t57=.91, p=.37). 
The result of the Sobel test2 suggests that consistency in perceptions of accuracy fully 
mediated the influence of message frame on consistency in decisions, z=4.79, p=.001. 
<Insert Figure 4> 
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Discussion 
We examined the effect of message frame and message format on experienced senior 
police officers’ perceptions of the accuracy of a hypothetical counter-terrorism technique in 
identifying whether a known terror suspect poses an imminent danger, their decisions about 
whether to recommend the technique to the Home Office, and their confidence in their 
recommendations. Our results have several theoretical and practical implications. 
First, consistent with our hypothesis and past literature on framing effects (e.g., 
Kuhberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998; Rothman & Salovey, 1997), we found that experienced, 
professionals are susceptible to the framing effect, as are naïve individuals. In particular, a 
greater proportion of senior police officers judged the counter-terrorism technique as 
effective and more would recommend adopting the technique when the accuracy of the 
technique was expressed as the percentage of correctly identified terror suspects (i.e., 
positive-framed message) rather than as the percentage of incorrectly identified suspects (i.e., 
negative-framed message). Thus, our results extend past research on framing effects to 
another domain (i.e., criminal justice and security) and to another population (i.e., 
experienced professionals). Our research also contributes to the small body of research on 
terrorism and risk perceptions. In fact, there is a dearth of published research on the effect of 
framed messages on risk perceptions and decision making in the terrorism context (Haider-
Markel, Joslyn, & Al-Baghal, 2006; Montiel & Shah, 2008), and most of the past work on 
terror risks has involved lay people or convenience samples of undergraduates (see Gibson, 
Lemyre, Clément, Markon, & Lee, 2007; Mandel, 2005; Spillman, 2003; Sunstein, 2003; see 
Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small 2005; Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Small, & Lerner, 2003 for 
exceptions). In addition, our study demonstrated the framing effect using a within-subjects 
design, whereas most past research on framing effects has used a between-subjects design. 
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Second, as predicted, we found that framing effect was eliminated when the message 
was communicated in a visual rather than numerical format. Indeed, when information about 
the counter-terrorism technique’s effectiveness was represented visually via icon arrays, a 
greater proportion of senior police officers judged the technique as equally accurate under 
positive and negative frames. Similarly, a greater proportion of participants were consistent in 
their decisions (i.e., made similar recommendations under positive and negative frames) 
under the visual as opposed to numerical format. Participants were also significantly more 
confident in their recommendations under the visual than numerical format. These results are 
robust as they persisted after controlling for participants’ sex, age, education, and years of 
experience. Thus, our study demonstrates a fairly simple method for reducing framing effects. 
Our results also extend our own and others’ past research on visual aids (Garcia-Retamero & 
Galesic, in press; Lipkus, 2007; Paling, 2003) by demonstrating the effectiveness of such aids 
in improving risk communication and understanding in a new domain and among 
experienced, professional decision makers.  
Third, of note, the present study reveals some key aspects of the cognitive processes 
that underlie the impact of visual aids on decisions. In particular, the results of the 
mediational analysis indicated that the influence of visual aids on consistency in decisions to 
recommend the technique was fully mediated by consistency in perceptions of the accuracy 
of the technique. These results are compatible with published research documenting the 
important role of risk perceptions in shaping behaviours in the health (see Floyd, Prentice-
Dunn, & Rogers, 2000; Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000) and financial domains (Simon, 
Houghton, & Aquino, 1999; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). The present study extends the past 
literature by providing evidence from experienced decision makers in the criminal justice 
domain. 
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A possible explanation for the differential impact of presenting risk information in a 
visual versus numerical format is that visual aids might have encouraged more precise, 
quantitative processing of the numerical information (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, in press). 3 
Previous research also suggests that individuals who more elaboratively encode and 
thoroughly process information during learning and risky decision making (Cokely & Kelley, 
2009; Cokely, Kelley, & Gilchrist, 2006) also tend to be less susceptible to the effects of 
message framing (Stanovich & West, 1998; but see also Corbin, McElroy, & Black, 2010 for 
boundary conditions). Visual aids may also have other properties that facilitate information 
comprehension (e.g., there might be a more transparent, fast, and memorable representation 
of risks; Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, 
& Woloshin, 2007). Our ongoing research is currently using cognitive process tracing 
techniques (e.g., eye-tracking, memory assessments, reaction time analyses, and protocol 
analyses) to assess the validity of this theoretical account (Okan, Galesic, & Garcia-
Retamero, 2012; Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Galesic, & Cokely, 2012; see Garcia-Retamero, 
Okan, & Cokely, 2012 for a review). 
In sum, our results support the notion that problems in communicating risks do not 
simply result because biases prevent good decision making (Garcia-Retamero, Hoffrage, & 
Dieckmann, 2006; Garcia-Retamero & Rieskamp, 2009). In contrast, errors occur because 
inappropriate information formats may complicate and mislead decision makers (Gigerenzer 
& Edwards, 2003; Gigerenzer et al., 2007). Using transparent formats to communicate risk 
information enhances comprehension and recall, and can help people to make better 
decisions. Importantly, unlike other methods proposed to improve decision making, visual 
aids do not put the onus on the decision maker to engage in some preventive measure. Visual 
aids are external to the individual and focus on improving his/her task environment.  
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Footnote 
1. Neither these nor the rest of the analyses including the interaction between message 
frame and message format were influenced by the order in which participants received the 
framed messages (i.e., in positive terms first vs. in negative terms first) or the color of the 
circles in the visual aids (i.e., white vs. black, and same vs. swapped in the positive- and 
negative-framed messages). The inclusion of participants’ sex, age, level of education, and 
years of experience in the analyses either as independent variables or as covariates did not 
systematically influence perceptions of accuracy, recommendation decisions, or confidence in 
decisions (Fs<1). 
2. The Sobel test (see Sobel, 1982) indicates whether the indirect effect of the 
independent variable through the mediator to the dependent variable is significant. 
3. A critic could argue that our results are due to the fact that participants in the visual 
aids conditions received similar information about the counter-terrorism when the risk 
information was framed in positive and negative terms. This might help participants infer that 
the percentage of terror suspect is the same in the two conditions. To exclude this alternative 
explanation of our results, we conducted a pilot study (n = 64 undergraduate students from 
the University of Granada, Spain). Participants in the study were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions. In two conditions, the information was represented visually in positive and 
negative terms as we reported in the methods section. In the other two conditions, the 
information was provided numerically and both in positive and negative terms. In one of 
these conditions, participants received the information framed in positive terms first; in the 
other condition, they received the information framed in negative terms first. In line with our 
previous findings, when information was provided numerically, the effect of framing was 
reliable (p=.001). Participants who received the numerical information framed in positive 
terms first perceived the technique as more accurate (3.40, SEM=.12) than those who 
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received the numerical information framed in negative terms first (3.01, SEM=.71). In 
contrast, when the information about the technique was presented visually, participants 
perceived the technique as equally accurate when framed in positive and negative terms 
(p=.624). We can then conclude that visual aids are highly effective for eliminating the 
framing effect because they might have encouraged more quantitative processing of the 
numerical information.  
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Appendix 
Participants read the following introductory statement in the first phase of the study: 
“In recent years, the Home Office has substantially increased counter-terrorism efforts. But 
the threat of attack remains real and constant. Imagine that the Home Office was considering 
adopting a technique based on offender profiling developed by Canadian intelligence officers, 
which predicts the likelihood of a known terror suspect committing a terrorist attack. The 
Canadians have provided the Home Office with data on the usefulness of the technique, and 
you are on an advisory panel to determine if it should be adopted in the U.K. Below is the 
summary of the Canadian data when using this technique. Please read this information and 
answer the questions that follow.”  
In the second phase of the study, participants read the following information: “If you 
remember, last week you imagined that the Home Office was considering adopting a 
technique based on offender profiling developed by Canadian intelligence officers, which 
predicts the likelihood of a known terror suspect committing a terrorist attack. This time, 
imagine that the Canadians have provided the Home Office with data on the usefulness of the 
technique when it was used in the U.S. You are again on an advisory panel to determine if it 
should be adopted in the U.K. Below is the summary of the U.S. data. Please read this 
information and answer the questions that follow.”  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Icon arrays representing visually the information about the usefulness of the 
technique framed in positive (Figure 1a) and negative terms (Figure 1b). 
Figure 2. Average perceptions of the accuracy of the technique as a function of message 
frame and message format. Error bars represent one standard error. 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants who would recommend the Home Office adopting 
the technique by message frame and message format. Error bars represent one standard 
error. 
Figure 4. Path analysis of the effect of message format on consistency in recommendation 
decisions, and the mediational effect of consistency in perceptions of accuracy. Note: 
Standardized coefficients and the coefficient after controlling for consistency in perceptions 
of accuracy in parenthesis are shown *p<.001. 
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Figure 1a 
Terror suspects who 
were correctly 
identified as posing an 
imminent danger when 
using the technique
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and committed an attack
 
 
 
Figure 1b 
Terror suspects who 
were not correctly 
identified as posing an 
imminent danger when 
using the technique
Terror suspects who organized 
and committed an attack
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